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SANJEEV COKE,

A

CRITIQUE - AN EVALUATION OF
ARTICLE 39(B)
Mihir Naniwadekar*

This paper seeks to look atthe DirectivePrincipleenshrined in Article 39(b) of
the Constitutionof India and analyze it in light of the Fundamental Rights
enshrined in the Constitution. The authorshall demonstrate that the Supreme
Courtof India has been mistaken in its analysis of the scope of Article 39(b);
particularlyin relation to Article 31C, andgenerallyin relationto PartIII ofthe
Constitution.The interpretationplacedby the Court in Sanjeev Coke is currently
being reviewed by a largerBench of ninejudges. This paperattempts to posit the
argument that Article39(b) should not be deployed towards the nationalization
ofprivate property or the collectionof assets/resourcesby the State, but must,
instead,be interpretedsuch that it applies to the stageofdistribution,as distinct
from the stage of collection, of assets.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Vhen Article 39(b) refers to material resourcesof the community, it does not
refer only to resourcesowned by the community as a whole but also to resources
owned by individualmembers ofthe community. Resources of the community do
not only mean public resources, but includeprivate resourcesas well.'
The content of the "socialist" philosophy which is said to permeate our
Constitution has consistently evoked great debate. Much of this debate has had
to do with the interpretation of Part IV of the Constitution of India, and its
41 Year, B. A. LL. B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
Per Chinappa Reddy J., Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co. v. Bharat Coking Limited,
A. I. R. 1983 S. C. 239 [S. C.] [hereinafter "Sanjeev Coke"].
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interrelationship with Part III. Part IV of the Constitution deals with the Directive
Principles of State Policy. These principles, designed to usher in economic and
social equality, are in the form of directions to the legislatures and the executive
as to the manner in which they should exercise their powers.2 The "socialist"
tinge in constitutional interpretation has always been sought to be supported by
the Directive Principles, particularly by Article 39(b). Recent judicial
pronouncements, however, seem to have taken a re-look at this interpretative
philosophy. In this paper, I seek to look at the Directive Principle enshrined in
Article 39(b) of the Constitution and analyse that Article in light of the
Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution. I shall demonstrate that the
traditional understanding of the Supreme Court of India in its analysis of the scope
of Article 39(b) in relation to Article 31C in particular, and Part III of the Constitution
in general (exemplified through the decision in Sanjeev Coke) is mistaken.
In essence, Sanjeev Coke decided that the nationalization of private property
was included under Article 39(b), so as to protect (through Article 31C) any
nationalization law from a fundamental rights challenge. The interpretation
placed by the Court in Sanjeev Coke is currently being reviewed by a larger bench
of the Court.3 In my submission, the newer approach of the judiciary is more in
consonance with the Constitution than the approach adopted in Sanjeev Coke;
and the decision to reconsider Sanjeev Coke must be applauded. The correct
interpretation of Article 39(b) should not lead to the application of the Article to
the nationalization of private property, or to the collection of assets/resources by
the State. Instead, it must apply to the stage of distribution of assets, as distinctfrom
the stage of collection of assets.'
I shall begin by briefly outlining the general relationship between Part It and
Part IV of the Constitution- Next, I shall look into the traditional interpretation placed
by the judiciary on Article 39(b) taking into account Article 31C of the Constitution,
as well as the other provisions of Part III. Finally, I shall proceed to demonstrate
why the approach of the judiciary in Sanjeev Coke has been mistaken. I shall conclude
by laying out what I believe the correct interpretation of Article 39(b) to be.
2

VII CONsT. AssEMB. DEB. 493-494, M. P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1363 (2003)

[Hereinafter "JAIN"].
Property Owners' Association v. State of Maharashtra, A. I. R. 2001 S. C. 1668 [S. C.]
[hereinafter "Property Owners' Association"].
4

Article 39 reads:
39 -The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing ...
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resourcesof the community are so distributed
as best to subserve the common good...
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11.

THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTS

III AND IV

The FundamentalRights andDirective Principlesconstitute the conscience of
the Constitution... There is no antithesisbetween the FundamentalRights and
DirectivePrinciples... and one supplements the other.'

A. The Changing Judicial Trend
Part III of the Constitution deals with Fundamental Rights, whereas Part
IV deals with the Directive Principles of State Policy. The question of the

interrelationship between the two has been one of some difficulty, and the judicial
attitude towards the issue has undergone a change over time.' In Champakam
Dorairajanithe Supreme Court stated that in case of a conflict between the two,
the Fundamental Rights would prevail over the Directive Principles. This view
was based on the fact that the former, unlike the latter, were enforceable. In Kerala
Education,' Das C.J. held that the Directive Principles on free and compulsory
education could not be implemented at the expense of the rights of minorities.
Thus, support can be drawn from this case for an argument advocating the
supremacy of Fundamental Rights over the Directive Principles.' Nevertheless,
Das C.J. stated that the Directive Principles could not be ignored entirely, and
should be reconciled with the Fundamental Rights by adopting a harmonious
construction."o In Kesavananda," it was stated by a number of Judges that Part III
and Part IV were supplementary to each other. Thus, it will be noticed that the
judicial tendency has been to adopt an integrated reading of the two Parts. The
"harmony and balance between FundamentalRights and Directive Principles" has been
stated to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.1 2

B. The Different Possible Interpretations
It has been argued by Mr. Seervai that the Supreme Court's attitude is one

of shirking its responsibility to deal with the problem. While it is acceptable to
assert that the two Parts must be harmoniously constructed, such an approach
6
6
7

8
9
10

Per Hegde and Mukherjea JJ., Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A. I. R. 1973
S. C. 1461, 1641 [S. C.] [hereinafter "Kesavananda"].
JAIN, supra note 2, at 1367.
State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 226 [S. C.].
In re the Kerala Education Bill, A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 956 [S. C.][hereinafter "Kerala Education"].
H. M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 1948 (1993) [hereinafter "SEERVAI"].
Kerala Education, A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 956, 966 [S. C.]. See, State of Kerala v. N. M.
Thomas, A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 490 [S. C.].

1

Kesavananda at 1641.

12

Per Chandrachud C. J., Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1980 S. C. 1789 [S. C.]
[hereinafter "Minerva Mills"]. See, AusTIN, WORIGNG A DEMOCRATIC CONsTITTION: AHISToRY
OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 498-507 (1999).
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does not solve the interpretational dilemma that arises when such a harmonious
construction is not possible.' KeralaEducation does demonstrate that such a conflict
is possible. Mr. Seervai maintains that a law violating Fundamental Rights cannot
be said to be valid and can be declared invalid; however a law violating the
Directive Principles cannot be declared to be invalid. Therefore, it must be held in
law that the Fundamental Rights are in a superior position to the Directive
Principles.' He further submits that the argument that Fundamental Rights are
the means to achieve the ends of the Directive Principles is wrong; that
Fundamental Rights are ends in themselves."
Mr. Seervai's argument, which represents one end of the spectrum, may
possibly be countered by Mr. Sudarshan's argument that while Article 37 states
that the Directive Principles are not "enforceable", they remain "justiciable"
There is a distinction between "enforceability" and "justiciability" The former
refers to an execution of a law, while the latter refers to a declaration. Therefore,
notwithstanding the unenforceability of the Directive Principles, the Courts
should be able to issue declaratory judgments based on them. In other words, the
Courts can - notwithstanding Article 37 - declare invalid any law which violates
a Directive Principle. 6 This, then, would be the other end of the spectrum.
This latter position of Mr. Sudarshan appears unsound. It seeks to create an
illusory distinction as Directive Principles cannot be treated as justiciable without
implying that there is some concrete enforceable right involved." In other words,
justiciability implies enforceability since a declaratory act striking down a law for
the violation of Directive Principles would carry with it the implication that these
Principles are enforceable entitlements which must be protected. Further, although
support for Mr. Sudarshan's view may possibly be found in B.N. Rau's Draft of the
Constitution," the Constituent Assembly Debates seem to support Mr. Seervai's
position. 9 The Courts, however, have stuck to a middle path, 20 by seeking to
interpret Fundamental Rights in light of the Directive Principles.
13

SEERVAI,

14

SEERVAI,

1s

16
17

i1
19

supranote 9, at 1954-1955.
supranote 9, at 1965.
SEERVAI, supranote 9, at 1977.
See, Aditya Sudarshan, Constitutional Perspectives on Good Governance, 17 STUDENT B.
REv. 15, 28-30 (2005).
D. D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 112 (1994) [hereinafter "BASU"].
See, SHIVA RAO, THE FRAMING OF INDIA's CONSTITUTION: SELECT DOCUMENTS 7 (1968).
SEERVAI, supranote 9, at 1926. For Dr. Ambedkar's speech in the Constituent Assembly,
see VII CONsT. ASSEMB. DEB. 41 (recognizing expressly that if the Directive Principles
were breached, no remedy was available in the court of law. The remedy was

before the electorate at election time").
20

BASU,

supra note 17, at 110-113, Waman Rao v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S. C. C. 362

[S. C.]. See, Minerva Mills. See also, Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the
Basic Structure Doctrine,in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME
COuRT oF INDIA

107 (2000) [hereinafter "ESSAYS"].
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C. The Suggested Approach
It is submitted that in light of the specific discussion in the Constituent
Assembly Debates, it would not be correct to draw any distinction between
"enforceable" and "justiciable" Further, the Supreme Court's approach of
harmonious construction - though preferable - may not be capable of application

in cases where there is direct conflict between Parts III and IV. In such cases,
preference must be given in courts of law to the enforceable rights of Part 111.21 At
the same time, the Directive Principles may be used to determine the scope of
Fundamental Rights, or the reasonableness of the restrictions on those rights. For
example, the Directive Principles may be used to test the reasonableness of
restrictions under Article 19, or may be used as a test to determine the validity of

a particular classification for the purposes of Article 14. However, considering
that Fundamental Rights are also ends in themselves, fulfilling Directive Principles
at the cost of Fundamental Rights is problematic.

III. THE INTERPRETATION

OF ARTICLE 39(B)

The key word is 'distributed'and the genius of the Article, if we may say so,
cannot but begivenfull play as itfulfils the basic purpose of re-structuringthe
economic order.Each word in the Article has a strategicrole and the whole
Article is asocial mission. It embraces the material resourcesof the community.
Its task is to distributesuch resources.Its goalisso to undertake distributionas
best tosubserve the common good. It re-organizesby such distributionownership
and control."

A. The Prelude -Article 31C
In looking at the interpretation of Article 39(b), Article 31C must be
considered. It must be borne in mind that under Article 31C of the Constitution,
no law giving effect to Directive Principles, specified in, inter alia, Article 39(b), can
be deemed to be unconstitutional on the ground that it is inconsistent with, takes
away, or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. Thus,
once a law is held to be giving effect to Article 39(b), that law is immune from
challenge on the grounds of it violating Article 14 and/or Article 19. It is, however,

open to judicial review insofar as the question is that of whether it really gives
effect to Article 39(b). 3 In other words, Article 31C does not bar judicial review as
21
22

23

But see M. P. DUBE, ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT INTHE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 165

(1987).

Per Krishna Iyer J., State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 215
[hereinafter "Ranganatha Reddy"].
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A. 1. R. 1973 S. C. 1461 [S. C.].
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to the nexus between the impugned law and Article 39(b). 2 4 The connection
between the law and the Directive Principle it purports to give effect to must be
a real and substantial one.5
The original Article 31C, as introduced by the Constitution (Twenty-Fifth
Amendment) Act, 1971 consisted of two limbs. Thefirst limb stated that a law
giving effect to a policy securing the principles in Articles 39(b) and (c) could
not be struck down as incompatible with Articles 14 or 19. The second limb
sought to oust the jurisdiction of the courts in determining whether the law
in reality gave effect to the principles in Articles 39(b) and (c). A declaration
by the law would be sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. In
Kesavananda,Sikri C.J., Shelat, Hegde, Grover and Mukherjea JJ. held the entire
Article 31C invalid. Ray, Palekar, Mathew, Beg, Dwiwedi and Chandrachud
JJ. upheld Article 31C in its entirety. Reddy J. upheld the first limb after
deleting certain parts from it, and held the second limb as invalid. Khanna J.
held the entire first limb valid and the entire second limb invalid. 26 Thus, in
effect, Kesavananda held by different majorities (a) the first limb to be valid
and (b) the second limb to be invalid. By the Constitution (Forty-Second
Amendment) Act, 1976, the scope of Article 31C was extended so as to give
primacy to all Directive Principles (instead of only Article 39) over Article 14
and 19. This was held to be invalid in Minerva Mills. 2 7 In Sanjeev Coke, the
28
decision in Minerva Mills was scrutinized, and doubted in obiter observations.
The Court now said that the validity of Article 31C had been conclusively
decided in Kesavananda.The Court recognized that the scope of protection afforded
under Article 31C had been extended in 1976. However, it saw no reason why the
reasoning in Kesavananda could not be applied to the extended Article 31C.29
Thus it will be seen that the interpretation of Article 39(b) has an important
bearing, considering that, at the very least, under Article 31C, the nexus of the
law with the said Directive Principle is open to judicial review.0
24
25
26

Assam Sillimanite v. Union of India, A. 1.R. 1992 S. C. 938 [S. C.].
State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai, A. 1. R. 1986 S. C. 1466 [S. C.].
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A. 1.R. 1973 S. C. 1461 [S. C.], David Gwynn
Morgan, The Indian "EssentialFeatures" Case, 30(2) INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 307 (1981), AK
Ganguli, Right to Property: Its Evolution and Constitutional Development in India, 48
JILI 489 (2006). See, VN SHfuIGA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 270-272 (2001). See also, UPENDRA
BAxI, COURAGE, CRAFT AND CONTENTION: THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT IN THE EIGHTIES (1985).

27

Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A. 1. R. 1980 S. C. 1789 [S. C.].

28
29

Per Chinappa Reddy J.
See, SEERVAI, supra note 9, at 2006-2008.

so

K. R. Lakshmana v. State of Tamil Nadu, A. I. R. 1996 S. C. 1153 [S. C.].
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B. The Question under Consideration
Turning now to the main question of the interpretation of Article 39(b), it
will be useful to set out at the beginning the wording of the Article itself.
39 - The State shall, in particular,direct its policy towards securing(b)thatthe ownershipand control of the materialresourcesof the community are
so distributedas best to subserve the common good...
1. The Material Resources of the Community
Insofar as the term "material resources" is concerned, it is wide enough
to cover not just natural resources, but also movable and immovable
properties as such.31 There is no great controversy thus far. The trouble arises
with the question of whether the material resources of individual members of
the community are also included in the phraseology of the Article. An
argument often raised before the courts has been that the material resources
of the community means property vested in the community, i.e. the State.
Thus, it does not include private property. As such, the material resources of
individual members of the community are not included in the material resources
of the community. The majority of a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court
in Ranganatha Reddy felt it necessary to assess the validity of the Karnataka
Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, with reference to Articles 14 and
19.32 The Act was held valid in light of its compatibility with Articles 14 and
19. It was felt necessary to assess the validity of the acquisition Act against
the touchstone of Articles 14 and 19, without using Article 31C read with

Article 39(b) as a shield.
2. Krishna lyerJ.'s Opinion and Sanjeev Coke

In his concurring judgment in RanganathaReddy, Krishna lyer J. stated (in
obiter) that the phraseology used in Article 39(b) includes private property.
This view is based on the idea that the key word in Article 39(b) is "distribute",
and that distribution includes nationalization. Now, if nationalization is
allowed under Article 39(b), clearly, the subject-matter of the distribution
must include private property. This view has been accepted in Sanjeev Coke in
the judgment delivered by Chinappa Reddy J. However, no basis for this
approach can be seen in either Krishna Iyer J.'s judgment or in Sanjeev Coke. In
the second Minerva Mills case too (this was decided after Sanjeev Coke), Krishna
31

32Per

State of Tamil Nadu v. Abu Kavur Bai, A. . R. 1984 S.C. 326 [S. C.] [hereinafter "Kavur Bai"].

Untwalia J.
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Iyer J.'s approach has been followed.m The Court in that case refused to adjudicate
upon the question of whether the Sick Textiles Undertakings (Nationalization)
Act, 1974 violated Articles 14 and 19. Co-incidentally, the two-judge bench in
this case included Chinappa Reddy J.This approach has been strengthened further
in Kavur Bai where the Tamil Nadu State Carriages and Contract Carriages
(Acquisition) Act, 1971 was held valid under Article 39(b). However, a Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court in Property OwnersAssociation has opined, while dealing
with provisions regarding acquisition in the Maharashtra Housing and Area
Development Act, 1976 that the views in Sanjeev Coke require reconsideration by
a larger bench. Thus, judicial opinion on the issue is divided.

3. The Correct Legal Position
The other approach, distinct from that of Krishna Iyer J., would be to say
that "material resources of the community" would mean those resources which
vest in the community, i.e. the State, and distribution, therefore, cannot include
nationalization. The State may nationalize as part of a reasonable restriction on
the right to property, and this must be in accordance with the Fundamental
Rights. The protection of Article 39(b) read with Article 31C cannot protect
nationalization. Article 39(b) only kicks in after the nationalization is over; with
respect to the distribution of proceeds of the government. In other words, taking
the example of taxation, the Article 31C protection applies not to the collection of
taxes, but to the distribution of the proceeds after collection.
In Krishna Iyer J.'s view, even the collection of assets would be included
under "distribution". In a hypothetical case, then, a tax law would not be subject
to challenges under Articles 14 or 19. Even if a tax were prohibitory, it would not
be subject to a challenge on the grounds of Article 19. If it was entirely
discriminatory and arbitrary, it would not be susceptible to an Article 14
challenge. Clearly, this is an absurd result and out of touch with constitutional
realities. A number of cases have struck down laws levying taxes on the grounds
of violations of Articles 14 and 19." For example, the Supreme Court, in Indian
Express, held that the impugned tax on newspapers was in the common good.

However, it was necessary to reconcile the social interestwith the fundamentalfreedoms.
Clearly, then, a taxing statute may be in the common good - yet it will be subjected
to the scrutiny of the Fundamental Rights." If Krishna Iyer J.'s statement of law,
"
"

Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A. 1. R. 1986 S. C. 2030 [S. C.].
K. T. Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala, A. 1.R. 1961 S. C. 552 [S. C.], State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Raja Reddy, A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1458 [S. C.], Indian Express Newspapers

5

v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1986 S. C. 515 [S. C.] [hereinafter "Indian Express"].
Soli Sorabjee, Constitution, Courts, and Freedom of the Press and the Media, in SUPREME

BUT

NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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which was relied upon in Sanjeev Coke, is correct, this would have been entirely
impossible. Sanjeev Coke ignores this aspect entirely. It does not show - nor does it
make any attempt to show - how the acquisition of property is fundamentally
distinct from the collection of taxes. If tax laws can be subjected to the tests of
Articles 14 and/or 19, the collection of assets by measures other than taxation
must also be so subjected. In that event, distribution under Article 39(b) cannot
refer to the collection of assets, whatever the measure of such collection. A
collection of assets has a much more direct impact on the Fundamental Rights
than the distribution after the collection. Any collection ofassets by whatsoever measure
which involves a violation of Articles 14 and/or 19 cannot, in reality, subserve the

common good (although the fruit of such collection might subserve the common
good) and, therefore, cannot come within the ambit of Article 39(b). This approach
also appears to be in accordance with the meaning of the verb "to distribute" "to distribute" means "to give out", and not, "to collect"
The correct legal position, then, is that "distribution" refers only to the
distribution, as distinctfrom the collection, of assets. Therefore, in the case of the
collection of assets from a private party, Articles 14 and 19 must be complied
with. The bar of Article 31C read with Article 39(b) comes into operation only in
deciding what to do with the collected assets. In such a case, material resources of the
community in Article 39(b) can only mean those resources which are already vested
in the State. In cases of resources vested with private parties, the State must first
acquire them without relying on Article 39(b).
Additionally, in Sanjeev Coke, it was contended by the Petitioner
(Respondent in the Supreme Court) that Article 31C basically codified the existing
constitutionalscheme developed by the judiciary. The existing constitutional scheme,
allowing for classification under Article 14, and for reasonable restrictions under
Article 19, itself meant that an Act genuinely giving effect to Articles 39(b) and (c)
would necessarily be compatible, and in consonance with, Articles 14 and 19. If
the Act was not in consonance with Article 14 or 19, it could not be said to be
giving effect to Articles 39(b) and (c). In support of this argument, reliance was
placed on Minerva Mills. The Court stated that accepting the argument would
mean that Article 31C was devoid of any new meaning, and, therefore, the said
argument could not be accepted. The point, however, is that the Petitioner was
contending that Article 31C did not have any new meaning, but codified the
existing judicial practice. Therefore, the Court's answer that the interpretation
which allowed for no new meaning cannot be preferred fails to deal with the
Petitioner's contention substantively. To answer that question, the Court should
have looked into whether Article 31C did have any new meaning - instead it

proceeded on the assumption that it did. In effect, the argument was rejected by
171
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assuming it to be false. Clearly, courts cannot, and in any event should not, reject
substantive arguments by unfoundedly assuming them to be devoid of merit. To
reject the argument, it was necessary to go into the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Had the Court done that, it would
have found that the new element in Article 31C was that of the second limb
which was struck down in Kesavananda. Therefore, after Kesavananda,Article 31C
was nothing more than a codification of judicial practice. 6 Therefore, the
argument of the Petitioner clearly possessed at least some merit, and should not
have been dismissed in the casual way in which it was. It seems incomprehensible
that the right to equality or the right to freedom is required to be violated to
implement a Directive Principle. It seems hard to believe that a law blatantly
violating the basic Fundamental Rights can ever be in the common good - indeed,
common good would require that the balance between the Fundamental Rights
and the Directive Principles be maintained, and that the latter not be privileged
by the Courts." This proposition draws even greater support from the fact that
the Supreme Court itself has consistently held that the balance between Parts III
and IV is a basic feature of the Constitution.
The drafting history of Article 39(b) also supports the conclusion that it
was not meant to apply to private property. Article 39(b) was incorporated into
the Draft Constitution as Draft Article 31(ii). It read exactly as the present Article
39(b) does. An amendment was moved in the Constituent Assembly by Prof. K.T.
Shah, wishing to qualify "material resources of the community" with words
making it clear that the phrase does not encompass private property." Prof. Shah's
amendment was objected to by Dr. Ambedkar as unnecessary because the
language of the Draft Article in any case included the propositionsof Prof. Shah. The
basis on which the amendment (which clarified that the Article did not apply to
private property) was rejected was that it made no change to the position under the
DraftArticle." Thus, dearly, the intention of the framers was to not include private
property within the ambit of Article 39(b).
One argument against the view taken above would be to say that the
phraseology in question is open to ambiguity. That ambiguity must be resolved
36
3

*

9

See, SUBHASH KASHYAP, CONSTITUTION MAKING SINCE 1950 77 (2004).
Michael Henderson, Setting India's Democratic House in Order: Constitutional
Amendments, 19(10) ASIAN SURVEY 946, 954 (1979) (citing Soli Sorabjee and Nani
Palkhivala in support of this proposition).
VII CONsT. ASSEMB. DEB. 506 (stating that the Amendment proposed adding the
words "natural resources of the country" and "in the shape of forests, rivers and flowing
waters..." to clarify that private property was not included in the scope of the
Article).
VII CONST. ASSEMB. DEB. 518-519.
172

Sanjeev Coke, A Critique - An Evaluation of Article 39(b)
by reference to the Preamble, which mentions the words "socialist" and "social
justice" In this light, it is necessary to include private property under the
terminology of Article 31C. However, it must be noted that first, the above
discussion shows that the wording is not really ambiguous. Secondly, in the context
of India, socialism must be understood in the context of a mixed economy which
is presently rapidly moving towards privatization. Further, excluding private
property from Article 39(b) does not harm the interests of "socialism". Socialism,
in the Indian context, is not doctrinaire socialism, and cannot be understood as
being against the idea of private property.' Also, the concept of socialism must
be balanced with the Fundamental Rights. The approach suggested in this paper
provides the best means of doing so, and will also further the cause of a harmonious
construction of the Directive Principles and the Fundamental Rights.

IV.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have looked at the interrelationship between the
Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy. In my submission,
the approach of the Supreme Court in Kesavanandaand MinervaMills, of balancing
and harmonizing the two is the most appropriate one. I have then looked into
Article 31C, read with Article 39(b), of the Constitution. Particular focus has been
given to the wording of the "material resources of the community" and "distribute".
It is submitted that the decision in Sanjeev Coke, that 'material resources of the
community' includes private property, and that "distribute" includes acquisition/
collection of assets is, in its entirety, incorrect. The reasoning in Sanjeev Coke can
easily be extended to other areas besides nationalization, particularly taxation.
Are we to suppose that tax laws are immune from Articles 14 and 19? The approach
of the Supreme Court shows clearly that this is not so. If tax laws are susceptible to
challenges under Articles 14 and 19 (and it is most proper that this be so), there is
no reason why acquisition or nationalization laws should not be so susceptible.
The intention of the framers in enacting Article 39(b) has been demonstrated as not
including private property within the "material resources of the community". The
approach of balancing the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles must
be preferred. Article 39(b) must then be read in light of Articles 14 and 19. In any
event, even assuming that there is a disjoint between the two, and that Article
31C as it exists now is more than a codification of already existing judicial practice,
the approach of balancing and harmonizing Parts III and Part IV would require
that "distribute" in Article 31C be read narrowly.
In this light, it is submitted that the decision in Sanjeev Coke flowing from
the concurring opinion in Ranganatha Reddy is clearly wrong and must be
40
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overruled. The correct position, for the reasons discussed above, is that which
was taken by Untwalia J. for the majority in RanganathaReddy - that of testing the
validity of acquisition laws against the touchstone of Articles 14 and 19. The
interrelationship between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles
is a complex one. A law purportedlyin the common good may be presumed to be a
valid restriction/classification. If, however, this presumption can be defeated
(perhaps because of excessive discrimination), then it cannot be said to actually be
in the common good. In other words, a law, the fruits of which are to be used for
the common good, for fulfilling the purposes of Article 39(b) (for example, taxation
or acquisition laws) may be strongly presumed to be creating a valid classification/
restriction. If, however, this presumption (perhaps stronger than the usual
presumption of constitutionality, as is common in fiscal and economic statutes)
is rebutted, the law is not really in furtherance of the common good (even though
its fruits are to be used for the common good).
To conclude, it may be stated that what is protected under Article 39(b),
read with Article 31C, is the allocation of the fruits, i.e. the resources already vested
in the State. In gathering those fruits, the State must respect all Fundamental Rights
(and in this it will be aided by the presumption of constitutionality) including
those enshrined in Articles 14 and 19.
With respect, therefore, it is submitted that the recent approach of the
judiciary, calling in question the interpretation placed in Sanjeev Coke, is far from
reproachable and deserves to be commended. It is submitted, with respect, that
the decision in Sanjeev Coke be reconsidered in this light.
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